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rough formula the Court posed a reasonable answer to the religious aid
issue. Lunches, health care and transportation can be upheld under the
pupil benefit theory as not being part of the actual educational function
that the Court has found to be "inextricably intertwined"' 8 with religion.
Textbooks, however, are an inseparable part of the primary educational
function of schools and should have been invalidated. Though this
approach would require the bolder actions of overruling Board of
Education v. Allen 9 and striking the textbook program in Meek, it
would more clearly establish the lines of state neutrality without requirine the sacrifice of consistency.
ERIC NEWMAN

Criminal Procedure-Prison Escapee's Pending Appeal
Dismissed Despite Early Recapture
Escape from prison or other official custody is not only a commonlaw' or statutory 2 offense but it can also be a ground for major procedural disabilities. Summary dismissal of the pending appeal of a prison
escapee or other fugitive from justice, at least while the appellant is still
at large, is accepted practice in many appellate courts. 3 The result of this
procedure is a total preclusion of review of an escaping prisoner's
original conviction. In Estelle v. Dorrough4 the United States Supreme
Court extended its approval of this practice twofold by holding that a
Texas statute5 that allowed the automatic dismissal of an escaping
68. Id. at 1764, quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971). See text
accompanying note 21 supra.
69. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
1. United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa.
1947); Smith v. State, 145 Me. 313, 75 A.2d 538 (1950); State v. Pace, 192 N.C. 780,
136 S.E. 11 (1926).
2. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-45 (1973); TEx. PENAL CODE art. 38.07 (1974).

3. See text accompanying notes 32-41 infra.
4. 420 U.S. 534 (1975) (per curiam).
5. TEx. CODE CRIM.PRO. ANN. art. 44.09 (1966). This statute provides:
If the defendant, pending an appeal in the felony case, makes his escape
from custody, the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals shall no longer
attach in the case. Upon the fact of such escape being made to appear, the
court shall, on motion of the State's attorney, dismiss the appeal; but the order
dismissing the appeal shall be set aside if it is made to appear that the defendant has voluntarily returned within ten days to the custody of the officer from
whom he escaped; and in cases where the punishment inflicted by the jury is
death or confinement in an institution operated by the Department of Correc-
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felon's pending appeal, not only when the felon is recaptured soon after
his escape but also when his appeal is not delayed, did not violate the

equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
The history of the case began in 1963 when Jerry Mack Dorrough

was convicted in a Texas court of felonious bank robbery and given a
twenty-five year sentence. Direct appeal was taken to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals. While his appeal was still pending, Dorrough escaped

from jail by stealing a United States mail truck. Two days later he was
recaptured. Thereafter the appellate court, upon motion by the State,

dismissed Dorrough's appeal pursuant to article 44.09 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure. The statute in effect required automatic
dismissal since "jurisdiction. . . shall no longer attach" if the appellant
escapes.7 There are, however, two express exceptions. The order dis-

missing the appeal must be set aside if the escapee is a term felon who
voluntarily surrenders within ten days, and the order may be set aside if
the escapee is a felon under a life or death sentence who surrenders or is

recaptured within thirty days.8 Since Dorrough was only serving a term
of years and since his recapture prevented his voluntary surrender, the
appellate court did not (and could not) reinstate his appeal.9
Dorrough was then charged under federal law for theft of the mail

truck, to which he pleaded guilty and was given a twenty-five year
federal prison term. He is now serving this sentence and is also being
held under a Texas detainer warrant for his original state sentence.' 0

After numerous unsuccessful challenges to his federal guilty plea
and to the state detainer warrant," Dorrough sought federal habeas
tions for life, the court may in its discretion reinstate the appeal if the defendant is recaptured or voluntarily surrenders within thirty days after such escape.
6. 420 U.S. at 539.
7. See note 5 supra.
8. See note 5 supra.
9. See note 5 supra. See also Maugia v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 539, 236 S.W. 740

(1922).
10. 420 U.S. at 535.
11. There were four attacks on his guilty plea under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) and
one challenge to the detainer warrant prior to the present case, all in the federal courts.
The merits of the state case were not considered. The full case history is as follows:
Dorrough v. United States, 327 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Dorrough v.
United States, 344 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam); Dorrough v. United States,
385 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd en banc, 397 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1968) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1019 (1969); Dorrough v. Texas, 440 F.2d 1063 (5th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 959 (1971);
Dorrough v. United States, 440 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 915, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971); Dorrough v. Estelle, 497 F.2d 1007
(5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (per curiam), rehearing
denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975).
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corpus relief on the ground that the earlier dismissal of his state appeal
denied him equal protection. The district court denied relief but the
Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered the state detainer warrant voided
unless Dorrough was given a direct appeal or a new trial for his state
offense.1 2

The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in a five to four per
curiam opinion. 13 After stating that "there is no federal constitutional
right to state appellate review of state criminal convictions,"' 4 the Court
held that the classifications' 5 created by the exceptions in the Texas
mandatory dismissal law did not violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.'" Relying upon traditional equal protection
analysis, the Court applied the rational basis test'1 to the statute since no
fundamental interests or suspect criteria were involved.18 Under this
standard, the Court reasoned that the classifications were rationally
related to the legitimate state interests of discouraging escapes, encouraging surrenders and promoting the "efficient, dignified operation of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals."' 9 In dissent, Justices Stewart, Bren-

nan and Marshall stressed both the irrationality of dismissing an appeal
after the appellant-escapee is back in the custody and control of the
court, and the disparity of punishments resulting from application of the
Texas law.20
A few other states have statutes similar to the one upheld in
Estelle.21 Yet, in the absence of a statute, decisional law uniformly has
12. Dorrough v. Estelle, 497 F.2d 1007, 1014 (5th Cir. 1974) (Wisdom, J., for the
court in an excellent opinion).
13. 420 U.S. at 534. Texas sought review under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1970).
Certiorari was granted in the present case, 420 U.S. at 536.
14. 420U.S.at 536.

15. Article 44.09 of the Texas Code creates at least four classifications: (1)
escaping felons v. escaping misdemeanants, (2) escape pending appeal v. escape before
appeal, (3) felons serving a life or death sentence v. felons serving a term of years, and
(4) term felons surrendering within ten days v. term felons surrendering after ten days.
See note 5 supra.
16. 420 U.S. at 539.
17. Id. at 538-40. See also notes 71-76 and accompanying text infra.
18. These phrases were not specifically mentioned in the opinion but it seems clear
that the majority did not consider the defendant's interest in appellate review to be
"fundamental." See 420 U.S. at 536.
19. Id. at 537.
20. Id. at 542-45. Justice Douglas filed a short separate dissent. Id. at 542.
21. E.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 6-809(b) (1972) (dismissal of appeal for mootness);
OxzA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1058 (1951) (appeal bond subject to condition that
defendant not depart without leave of court). The Texas law (article 44.09), however,
appears to be unusually harsh in expressly requiring dismissal for a recaptured escapee,
since this statute deprives the court of jurisdictionwhen the appellant has escaped. The
Oklahoma statute gives the court discretion to dismiss. Trotter v. State, 334 P.2d 452
(Okla. Crim. App. 1959). The Georgia statute has been construed to require mandatory
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sustained the appellate dismissal practice as it applies to the non-

returning appellant-escapee 2 and sometimes as to the returning escapee. 23 In the relatively few escape-pending-appeal cases to reach the
Supreme Court, the first question faced was whether there is a constitutional right of appeal. Answering this in the negative, 24 the Court on

several occasions has then proceeded to approve of the practice of
dismissal for escape. 25 In fact, the Supreme Court itself has either
"removed the appeal from its docket" or dismissed certiorari when the

appellant escaped after the granting of certiorari.
Smith v. United States28 was an important early case in which the
appeal was conditionally ordered off the Supreme Court docket unless
the appellant returned before the next term of Court. Although Smith
involved an appeal from a state conviction, the case established the
Supreme Court's own early dismissal practice; 27 it did not establish the
validity of state court dismissal practice. Nevertheless, the rationale of
Smith, the inability of a court to enforce its judgment against a fugitive,
is potentially applicable at all levels of appeal: "If we affirm the judg-

ment, [the escapee] is not likely to appear to submit to his sentence. If
we reverse it and order a new trial, he will appear or not, as he may
consider most for his interest."28 The Court's present method of disposition of an escapee's appeal is unconditional dismissal of certiorari.2 9
Not long after Smith the Supreme Court had occasion to review a
0 In this case, a state
state appellate dismissal rule in Allen v. Georgia."
court's semi-discretionary practice of dismissal subject to reinstatement
dismissal for escape, Pope v. State, 126 Ga. App. 488, 191 S.E.2d 115 (1972), but the
case involved a non-returning escapee. It is not clear how Georgia would treat a
recaptured escapee. His appeal ought not to be moot once he returns to custody.
22. See note 39 infra.
23. See note 41 infra.
24. See note 78 infra.
25. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam); Eisler v. United
States, 338 U.S. 189 (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949), noted in 18
GEo. WASH. L REV. 427 (1950), 48 MIcH. L.REv. 112 (1949), and 7 WASH. & LEE LT
REv. 214 (1950); Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897); 'Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125
U.S. 692 (1887); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876). See also United States v.
Campos-Serrano, 404 'U.S. 293, 294 n.2 (1971) (dictum); National Union of Marine
Cooks v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 43 (1954) (dictum).
26. 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
27. Smith was followed in two later cases, Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189
(per curiam), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949), and Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S.
692 (1887).
28. 94 U.S. at 97.
29. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam). Certiorari was not
dismissed in Estelle because the Court was reviewing a state court's dismissal. In
Molinaro the appellant escaped after certiorari was granted.
30. 166 U.S. 138 (1897).
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was upheld over a due process challenge. Reasoning that a fugitive
should not dictate the terms of his surrender, the Supreme Court permitted the Georgia courts to set a sixty-day limit for return to custody. In
Allen, recapture of the escapee one year later was found not sufficient
for reinstatement of the appeal, despite the fact that the escapee faced a

death sentence.3 1
Practice in the state courts has generally been in accord with Smith
and Allen, but these courts often differ about the manner in which the
appeal is dismissed, the legal theories employed, and the policy reasons
considered. The methods of disposing of escapees' appeals are in large

part classifiable as either unconditional dismissal32 or conditional dismissal. Unconditional dismissal is usually tantamount to dismissal with
prejudice but some courts allow eventual reinstatement.8 4 Conditional

dismissal means that the escapee's appeal will be dismissed unless he

returns to custody within a certain period of time, usually thirty days8"
but sometimes longer. 36 The return to custody may be either by recap31. Id. at 139.
32. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam); Lofton v. State,
149 Miss. 514, 115 So. 592, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 568 (1928); State v. Page, 23 N.C.
App. 539, 209 S.E.2d 379 (1974); Forder v. State, 456 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Crim. App.
1970); see Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S.
883 (1949).
33. Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 (1887); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97
(1876); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Laird, 432
F.2d 77 (9th Cir.), merits considered, 435 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1970); People v. Estep,
413 Ill. 437, 109 N.E.2d 762 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 970 (1953); State v. Spry,
126 W. Va. 781, 30 S.E.2d 88 (1944). Some early cases spoke of "leaving the appeal off
the docket," until a certain date or until directions to the contrary, but this was similar to
conditional dismissal. See Bonahan and Smith supra. But see Eisler v. United States, 338
U.S. 189 (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949). See generally 18 GEo,
WASH. L. R-v. 427 (1950). One court in a recent case granted a general continuance
even though the appellant-escapee bad escaped once before and was still at large.
Commonwealth v. Galloway, 333 A.2d 741 (Pa. 1975). But indefinite postponement is
rare. See Jones v. State, 218 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1969), overruling Harrelson v. State, 222
Miss. 514, 76 So. 2d 516 (1954). On a few occasions the court has heard the appeal in
the appellant's absence. Irvin v. State, 236 Ind. 384, 139 N.E.2d 898 (1957), rev'd on
other grounds, 359 U.S. 394 (1959); Stevens v. State, 26 Ohio App. 53, 159 N.E. 834
(1927); State v. Broom, 121 Ore. 202, 253 P. 1042 (1927). In North Carolina, several
approaches have been taken including affirmance, dismissal, continuance, and leaving off
the docket. See State v. Williams, 263 N.C. 800, 140 S.E.2d 529 (1965). For a general
discussion of dismissal for escape pending appeal see 39 COLum. L. REv. 1244 (1939); 5
U. DEr. .IU.77 (1941); 18 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 427 (1950); Annot., 26 L.R.A.(N.S.)
921 (1910).
34. Miller v. State, 311 So. 2d 348 (Miss. 1975) (reinstatement for good cause).
Mere recapture may not be good cause, Mitchell v. State, 294 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1974),
but meritorious appeal may be, if the state's case has not been prejudiced by the escape.
White v. State, 514 P.2d 814 (Alas. 1973).
35. United States v. Eberhardt, 467 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); People
v. Clark, 201 Cal. 474,259 P. 47 (1927).
36. United States v. Shelton, 508 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1975) (reasonable time);
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ture or by surrender; results seldom turn on this distinction. 37 Another
fact of apparently little significance to either conditional or unconditional dismissal is the type of appeal involved. Courts tend not to distinguish
between statutory appeals of right and discretionary appeals, and hold
that both types are subject to some form of dismissal.3 8 Of vital importance, however, is the procedural juncture at which the escape occurs.
When the appellant escapes after he has been convicted and sentenced
and has filed his appeal, and is still a fugitive at the date set for the
appeal hearing, dismissal in some form is almost always granted.3"
When, however, the appellant escapes pending appeal but returns to
40
custody before the hearing date, the appeal is not usually dismissed.
In the few cases that allowed post-return dismissal, it appears that the
escapee delayed the appellate process by his long absence. 4
A second way in which courts differ is the legal theory employed as
the ground for dismissal. The four major theories are lack of jurisdiction, 42 mootness, 4 3 waiver" and abandonment, 45 but there is a cornucoState v. Mosley, 84 Wash. 2d 608, 528 P.2d 986 (1974) (until date of filing of court's
opinion).
37. 39 COLUM. L. REv. 1244, 1246 n.11 (1939) (collecting cases); see Brinlee v.
United States, 483 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). But cf. Johnson v. Laird, 432
F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1970).
38. United States v. Swigart, 490 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1973).
39. Shelton v. State, 131 Ga. App. 786, 206 S.E.2d 654 (1974); State v. Page, 23
N.C. App. 539, 209 S.E.2d 379 (1974); see 18 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 427, 428 (1950); 5
U. DET. L.J. 77 (1941).
40. Ruetz v. Lash, 500 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1974) (collecting federal cases);
People v. Mutch, 4 Cal. 3d 389, 482 P.2d 633, 93 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1971); Stevens v.
State, 26 Ohio App. 53, 159 N.E. 834 (1927); Commonwealth v. Galloway, 333 A.2d
741 (Pa. 1975). A clear statement of the rationale appears in the Galloway case, supra:
"Since Galloway [the escapee] is no longer a fugitive from justice and is now subject to
the jurisdiction of this Court, he will be responsive to any judgment this Court renders.
Therefore, this Court has no basis upon which to grant a motion to dismiss the appeal at
this juncture." Id. at 743.
41. See Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897) (absence of one year); cf. State v.
Dalton, 185 N.C. 606, 115 S.E. 881 (1923) (per curiam) (appeal docketed three years
late).
42. Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 (1887); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97
(1876); Gentry v. State, 371 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963); Vega v. State, 103
Tex. Crim. 308, 280 S.W. 824 (1926).
43. Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S.
883 (1949); Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897); United States v. Dawson, 350 F.2d
396 (6th Cir. 1965) (per curiam); Mitchell v. State, 294 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1974); State v.
John, 60 Wis. 2d 730, 211 N.W.2d 463 (1973). But see Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396
U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam). For a discussion of mootness see 41 I-Dv. L. REv. 534
(1927); 34 HARv. L. REV. 416 (1920). For a discussion of the related "case and
controversy" question of escape as raised by the Eisler case, supra, see 48 MICH. L. REV.
111 (1949).
44. Mitchell v. State, 294 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1974); State v. Jacobs, 107 N.C. 772, 11
S.E. 962 (1890); Hurt v. State, 72 Okla. Crim. 318, 115 P.2d 919 (1941.), noted in 5 U.
DET. L.J. 77 (1941); Kilpatrick v. State, 71 Okla. Crim. 125, 109 P.2d 514 (1941),
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pia of others including forfeiture,46 lack of standing,47 implied dismissal, 48 loss of an indispensable party, 49 lack of mutuality, 50 breach of
condition,5 "disentitlement", 52 and even contempt of court 3 and obstruction of justice. ' The ground of no jurisdiction, sometimes phrased
in terms of the Smith rationale of nonenforceability of judgment, is the
most common, and is the nominal basis for dismissal in Texas."5 These

distinctions between57 legal theories are often academic, 6 but they are
sometimes decisive.

Finally, courts support their dismissal decisions with various policy
considerations. Most of these fall into two categories: concern for orderly appellate procedure and concern for the proper methods of dealing
with criminal escapes. Included in the first are the policies favoring

prompt appeals,58 the policies against deciding moot cases, 19 and related
noted in 12 OKLA. B.A.J. 439 (1941); State v. Mosley, 84 Wash. 2d 608, 528 P.2d 986
(1974); State v. John, 60 Wis. 2d 730, 211 N.W.2d 463 (1973). But see Ruetz v. Lash,
500 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1974) (collecting cases); White v. State, 514 P.2d 814 (Alas.
1973). See generally 39 CoLUM. L. Rlv. 1244 (1939).
45. Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897); Mitchell v. State, 294 So. 2d 395 (Fla.
1974); Kirkman v. State, 232 Ind. 563, 114 N.E.2d 878 (1953); State v. DeVane, 166
N.C. 281, 81 S.E. 293 (1914); State v. John, 60 Wis. 2d 730, 211 N.V1.2d 463 (1973).
But see McKinney v. United States, 403 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1968).
46. Shelton v. State, 131 Ga. App. 786, 206 S.E.2d 654 (1974).
47. Lambert v. State, 21 Ala. App. 373, 108 So. 631 (1926); State ex rel. Ruetz v.
La Grange Cir. Ct., 258 Ind. 354,281 N.E.2d 106 (1972).
48. Cf. Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 338
U.S. 883 (1949).
49. Cf. State v. Carter, 299 A.2d 891 (Me. 1973).
50. Johnson v. Laird, 432 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Shapiro, 391
F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This ground means that a court is unwilling to allow a
defendant to gain the benefit of a favorable result when he is unwilling to risk the burden
of an adverse decision.
51. Stevens v. State, 26 Ohio App. 53, 159 N.E. 834 (1927); Trotter v. State, 334
P.2d 452 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
52. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam).
53. Crum v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 331, 23 S.W.2d 550 (1930); State v. Carter,
98 Mo. 431, 11 S.W. 979 (1889); State v. Jacobs, 107 N.C. 772, 11 S.E. 962 (1890); see
Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 141 (1897).
54. State v. John, 60 Wis. 2d 730,211 N.W.2d 463 (1973).
55. TEx. CODE CRlM. PRo. ANN. art. 44.09 (1966); Gentry v. State, 371 S.W.2d
566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
56. For example, Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897), seems to be based on four
or five separate theories.
57. See, e.g., White v. State, 514 P.2d 814 (Alas. 1973) (escape by itself held not
to constitute waiver). Most escapees probably do not voluntarily and knowingly give up
their statutory rights of appeal. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Furthermore the escapee's return to custody would seem to render most of the grounds
inapplicable.
58. Such as the court's interest in judicial economy, Loyd v. State, 19 Tex. Ct. App.
R. 137, 155 (1885), and similar interests of other appellants. See 39 COLUM. L. Rav.
1244, 1246 n.15 (1939).
59. Such as judicial economy and assuring vigorous adversary presentation. See
note 43 supra.
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arguments. 60 In the second category, some courts stress the impropriety
of allowing escapees to "blackmail" the state or dictate the terms of their

surrender.

1

But what occasionally stands out most sharply is an element

of punishment or retribution.

2

In some cases, dismissal of appeal is

viewed as an appropriate way of punishing either the escape itself6 3 or
the contempt of court or authority which the escape may represent.

4

Even if not directed to do so by statute, many courts seem compelled
to mete out procedural punishments for fugitives even before they are
tried for the crime of escape.63

This judicial condemnation of escape has been given a major boost
in Estelle v. Dorrough. 6 By upholding a statute which allows the
dismissal of an appeal despite the early recapture of the escapee, the

Supreme Court has signalled a significant extension of an accepted but
heretofore limited practice. First, the Texas statute does not limit the
applicability of the dismissal rule to appellant-escapees who are beyond
the court's jurisdiction at the hearing date, as was the situation in most
prior cases such as Smith."' The fact that the escapee is back in the
custody and control of the court and therefore subject to its decrees is no

longer of any consequence. Secondly, and likewise irrelevant to the
Court, is the fact that the escape may have no dilatory effect on the

appellate process, which in effect removes the limitation implicit in
Allen for dismissal only after a long absence by the escapee.0 9 Thirdly,

an escapee's intent to remain a permanent fugitive is not required.
Although not at issue in Estelle, the dismissal rule apparently would
apply with equal force to an escapee on the verge of surrender at the

time of recapture.7"
60. E.g., the fact that appeals are different from trials, State v. Jacobs, 107 N.C.
772, 11 S.E. 962 (1890), and the asserted analogy between civil and criminal dismissals.
Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897); State v. DeVane, 166 N.C. 281, 81 S.E, 293
(1914).
61. See, e.g., Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897).
62. See, e.g., id. at 141; cf. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (per
curiam).
63. Cf. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. at 366.
64. Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. at 141; see note 53 supra.
65. The escapee need not be tried for escape under the Texas statute. A sheriff's
affidavit is the only proof required that an escape has occurred, and it is sufficient to
authorize dismissal of the appeal. Tnx. CODE CiM. PRo. ANN. art. 44.10 (1966);
Cuevas v. State, 467 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Powell v. State, 99 Tex. Crim.
276, 269 S.W. 443 (1925). This issue, however, is almost never raised. See, e.g., Allen v.
Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897).
66. 420 U.S. at 534.
67. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
69. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
70. The Texas statute makes no provision for an inquiry into the escapee's state of
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From the standpoint of constitutional theory, Estelle is neither
inconsistent with nor an extension of prior law. No definitive new tests
or principles were enunciated or novel approaches taken. Rather, the
Court continued to employ the traditional two-tier equal protection
analysis7 ' often used in challenges to state legislative classifications.
Applying this approach to the Texas statute, the Estelle majority rejected the "strict scrutiny" standard of review by apparently reasoning that
since a criminal defendant's interest in appellate review is not constitutionally guaranteed, 7 2 a fortiori it is not "fundamental." This is consistent with the Court's recent hesitation to expand the list of fundamental
interests. 73 Rejection of strict scrutiny, of course, generally means acceptance of the "rational basis" standard of review.7 4 In accepting this
standard, the majority's holding that the Texas classifications were
rationally related to state interests 5 seems to be consistent with the
Court's usual allowance of wide latitude to state legislative choices under
this branch of the test."
mind. Such an inquiry would seem to be forbidden in light of the fact that escape
deprives the court of jurisdiction at the outset. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 44.09
(1966). One case, Leonard v. State, 53 Tex. Crim. 187, 109 S.W. 149 (1908), suggested
that intent to surrender might prevent dismissal, but this is contrary to the terms of the
statute, and the case was criticized in Gibson v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 345, 203 S.W. 893
(1918). At any rate, the escapee in Estelle apparently did not allege that he was ready to
surrender.
71. 420 U.S. at 539. This approach to equal protection can be phrased as an
inquiry in the following form:
Does the statutory classification affect a "fundamental interest" or is it
based on "suspect criteria!'?
(1) If so, then the "strict scrutiny" standard of review applies, meaning that
the classification is permissible (in equal protection terms) only if justified by a "compelling state interest."
(2) If not, then the looser "rational basis" standard of review applies, meaning
that the classification is permissible if rationally related to legitimate state
purposes.
See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of two-tier equal protection see Developments
in the Law-EqualProtection, 82 HARv. L REv. 1065 (1969). For a broad discussion of
equal protection in general see Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L RaV. 341 (1949).
72. 420 U.S. at 536; see cases cited note 78 infra.
73. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
74. See note 71 supra.
75. 420 U.S. at 537. The state interests mentioned were deterring escapes, encouraging surrenders, and expediting appeals. Id. The classifications created by the statute are
listed in note 15 supra.
76. 420 U.S. at 538 n.7; see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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Although not momentous in constitutional terms, the potentially
great impact of Estelle to criminal appellate procedure demands close

examination of the Court's application of the equal protection analysis
in the case. Beginning with the rejection of strict scrutiny review, the

majority's declaration that there is no constitutional right of appeal77 has
indeed been echoed through the years,7 but it has rarely appeared as
more than a bald assertion devoid of reasoning. Federal appeal is a

matter of statutory 79 and decisional

°

right and all states provide for ap-

peal by statute."' The Supreme Court itself has greatly expanded appel-

82
late access in recent years by requiring states to furnish free transcripts

and counsel8 3 to indigents on their first appeal of right.84 Also, the
Court now recognizes a generalized "right of access" to the courts 5 that
is grounded in the equal protection clause: "[A]venues [of appellate
review] must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only

impede the open and equal access to the courts. 8 8
77. More precisely, "no federal constitutional right to state appellate review of state
criminal convictions." 420 U.S. at 536.
78. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956); National Union of Maritime Cooks v. Arnold, 348
U.S. 37, 43 (1954); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
79. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294, 2106 (1970); FED. R. App. P. 4(b).
80. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); McKinney v. United States,
403 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1968). But cf. United States v. Swigart, 490 F.2d 914 (10th Cir.
1973).
81. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Tnx. CODE CRIM. PRO.
ANN. art. 44.02 (1966). See generally A.B.A. PRoJEcT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE-STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS (Approved Draft
1970).
82. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S.
189 (1971) (collecting cases).
83. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). See also Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967).
84. But not on discretionary appeal. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), noted in
53 N.C.L. REV. 560 (1975).
85. See Abram, Access to the Judicial Process, 6 GA. L. REv. 247 (1972);
Wedlock, The Emerging Rights of the Confined: Access to the Courts and Counsel, 25
S.C.L Rnv. 605 (1973); Note, The Expansion of a Prisoner'sRight of Access to the
Courts, 1 CAPITAL U.L. REv. 192 (1972).
86. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966), quoted in Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21, 25 n.4 (1974); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193 (1971); North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969), and Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S.
458, 459 (1969) (per curiam). In addition to indigents, the "right of access" rule has
been applied to prisoners in various contexts. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F.
Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S.
15 (1971) (per curiam). Other cases have acknowledged the importance of appeal in
general: "Justice demands an independent and objective assessment of a district judge's
appraisal of his own conduct of a criminal trial." Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 455-56 (Stewart, J., concurring). Also, some authorities have expressed the view
that the right of appeal is a fundamental aspect of due process. See, e.g., State ex rel.
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In sum, the Court in Estelle failed to take note of the constellation
of recent developments concerning appellate access and the de facto
right of appeal in current practice. Although a full inquiry into whether
appellate review should be a "fundamental" interest is beyond the scope
of this note, a first look suggests than an appeal from a criminal
conviction is at least as fundamental as certain other interests so recognized in recent years, such as travel 87 and privacy.88 When a defendant
faces years in prison, denial of review of his possibly erroneous conviction seems just as serious as denial of these other rights.
Also questionable is the Estelle Court's application of the "rational
basis" standard of equal protection review. Although a large portion of
the opinion dealt with this issue, the Court's conclusion that state
interests were rationally served s9 by a statute allowing dismissal for
escape despite recapture is unconvincing. In the first place, deterrence of
prison escape may be a proper state interest, but there is little support
for any rational relation between dismissal of a pending appeal and
deterrence of escape. Not only is there virtually no case law to support
this proposition" but there is also a dearth of empirical data. A statistical showing by the Court of some kind, such as one indicating that
dismissal practice reduced the number of escapes, would have been most
persuasive. The omission of such data is an unfortunate departure from
some recent cases in which the Court looked at the practical effect of a
statute as well as its theoretical effect.9 At least one "statistic," the large
amount of litigation under the Texas statute, belies the contention that
the threat of dismissal deters escapes. The escapee in Estelle certainly
was not deterred.
Statistics and precedent aside, common sense would seem to suggest that no real deterrence results from the Texas statute. If the
potential escapee is even aware of the existence of a statute on the
subject, dismissal of his appeal is probably the least of his concerns. Of
Ruetz v. La Grange Cir. Ct., 258 Ind. 354, 357, 281 N.E.2d 106, 109 (1972) (DeBruler,
J., dissenting).
87. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

89. 420 U.S. at 537.
90. The majority cited only one case for its deterrence argument, namely Rodriguez
v. State, 457 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). See 420 U.S. at 537 n.5. Rodriguez,
however, is totally unsupportive. Not only does the case fail even to mention deterrence,
but it does not even involve the same statute as Estelle. No case could be found which
suggests that the threat of dismissal deters escapes. One case suggests the opposite. See
White v. State, 514 P.2d 814, 815 (Alas. 1973).
91. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537
(1973); cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1974).

1976]

ESCAPEE'S APPEAL DISMISSED

235

doubtful validity is the majority's statement in Estelle that escapes are
"reasonably calculated to disrupt" the appellate process.9 2 Why would a

convict deliberately sabotage his only chance of obtaining legal freedom? The fact that such sabotage in fact occurs is evidence only of the

escapee's confused state of mind, perhaps brought on by his motives for
escape--desire for freedom, family troubles, denial of parole hearing,
threats on his life or others. 93 One commentator has pointed out that "to

the extent that psychological pressure affects the convict, the rational

basis of behavior which a deterrent theory presupposes is lacking." 94
In addition to deterrence, the Court in Estelle mentioned orderly

appellate procedure as a state interest that was furthered by the Texas
dismissal statute. 95 But again accepting this as a legitimate purpose, the
allegedly rational relationship between dismissal of appeal and orderly
procedure is questionable on two grounds. The first, which the Court

did not address, is the needlessness of punishing a defendant whose
escape has not been shown to prejudice the State's case. 96 Although
prejudice to the State could indeed result from a long absence by the
escapee, 97 prejudice after two days would be rare. The second reason,
also omitted from the Court's discussion and perhaps the Court's most

flagrant omission, is the reality that two days of an appellant's absence
during his escape is hardly likely to even delay his appeal, much less

disrupt the judicial process. Texas, like most states, allows a ten-day
period for the filing of all appeals. 9 Furthermore it has been estimated

that even under ideal conditions the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
does not hear a case until 165 days after conviction. 9 This suggests
a crucial distinction between the one year interval between escape and
recapture in Allen v. Georgia'"0 (relied upon by the majority), which
92. 420 U.S. at 541.

93. For a discussion of some psychological and social factors behind escapes see
Renteria and Holt, The Anatomy of an Escape, 33 AM. J.CoRRECnONS 10 (Jan./Feb.
1971). See also Loving, Stockwell and Dobbins, FactorsAssociated with Escape Behavior of PrisonInmates,23 FED. PROBATION 49 (Sept 1959).
94. 39 COLuM. L. REV. 1244, 1245 n.9 (1939).
95. 420 U.S. at 537.
96. See White v. State, 514 P.2d 814 (Alas. 1973).
97. Such as loss of evidence. See 39 CoLuM. L. REv. 1244, 1246 n.15 (1939).
98. Tnx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 44.08(c) (1966).
99. Reid, The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 44 TEXAS L. Rnv. 983, 1016
(1966). It is true that article 44.23 of the Texas Code authorizes the advancing of cases
out of their normal docket slots but this is almost never done. See, e.g., Gaines v. State,
58 Tex. Crim. 631, 127 S.W. 181 (1910), in which the court refused to advance an
appeal even though it was a homicide case and the accused was a member of the Texas
state legislature.
100. 166 U.S. 138 (1897); see text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
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could very well have delayed the appeal, and the two day interval in
Estelle.
It should also be stressed that there is no relation between a
dismissal rule and the purposes of deterrence or orderly judicial procedure when a felon can escape after conviction but before sentencing or
before filing the record on appeal and yet still be heard by the appellate
court. As the Texas statute has been construed, escaping felons can be
heard on appeal after their recapture if the record on appeal has not
been filed, even if notice of appeal was given before the escape."" 1 The
irrationality of these distinctions is obvious.
Finally, it is unfortunate that the Court failed to discuss alternative
measures available to states for dealing with prison escapes. Reduction
of the number of escapes, for example, would probably be better
achieved by increasing prison security, improving prison conditions, and
decreasing prison sentences. Not only would these methods have a far
more direct relation to escape than dismissal of appeal, but they would
also be much less severe to the prisoner. 102 Furthermore, if escapes
continued to occur despite these efforts, they could be punished by the
sentence
substantive penalties of fine or imprisonment or increased
04
already allowed by common law'03 and many state statutes.1
As a result of Estelle, Texas appellate calendars may be less
crowded and non-escaping appellants may not have their appeals delayed by escapees still at large. But the felon who escapes, for whatever
reason, will find his statutory right of review of one offense entirely cut
off by his subsequent commission of a wholly unrelated offense. This is
true even if the felon is never convicted or even prosecuted for the
second offense of escape, 0 5 and it may be true even if the escape is
justified. 10 6 This is not to condone escape. It is a serious offense which
101. McGee v. State, 445 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (appeal was
dismissed on other grounds); Walters v. State, 18 Tex. Crim. 8 (1885). See also
Cushman v. State, 493 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
102. It is true that, in equal protection litigation, the availability of less restrictive
alternatives has traditionally been a concern of the Court only in "strict scrutiny" cases
such as those involving first amendment rights. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-08
(1963) (collecting cases). But it should also be a factor in "rational basis" cases. When
the alternative chosen by the legislature is of minimal rationality to start with, and use of
the alternative greatly affects individual interests which, although may not be "fundamental," are nevertheless important, and there are several eminently feasible, superior,
and much less severe alternatives available to the state, then such alternatives should at
least be considered by the Court in an equal protection challenge.
103. See note 1 supra.
104. See note 2 supra.
105. See note 65 supra.
106. Justification for escape, though rare, has been found in some instances, such as
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should be punished, but the penalty should be substantive, and only
after a due process conviction at a separate trial for the escape. Some
procedural sanctions such as conditional dismissal of appeal may be
justifiable when the escapee is still at large, but never after recapture
when personal jurisdiction has reattached, especially if the appeal has
not been delayed.
The preclusion of review allowed by Estelle means that a prison
term must be served by the escapee regardless of errors in his original
conviction which, had an appeal been allowed, might have resulted in a
new trial or outright reversal. Apart from this borderline due process
consideration, there is a serious equal protection issue not fully faced by
the majority. As Justice Stewart indicates in his dissent, 0 7 a real possibility exists of two prisoners escaping at the same time and in the same
manner and yet suffering completely disparate sentences dependent
upon the fortuity of errors at trial, and wholly unrelated to the gravity of
the offense of escape. Although the majority in Estelle v. Dorrough
considered the interests of appellate courts in judicial economy, the
interests of other appellants in expeditious appeals, and the interests of
the state and the public in deterring escape, the most important
interest-that of an inmate under a quarter-century prison term in
having justice done-has been sadly neglected.
OTHO B. Ross,

m

Federal Income Taxation-Transfers to and Leasebacks from a
Short-Term Trust
For almost thirty years' tax planners have been frustrated by the
judicial confusion surrounding the deductibility of rental payments
made by a settlor for property used in his trade or business which he has
transferred to and leased back from a short-term trust.2 To date, two
for duress due to homosexual threats. People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220
N.W.2d 212 (1974), noted in 43 U. Cun. L. REv. 956 (1974). The escapee in Estelle
apparently did not seek to justify his escape.

107. 420 U.S. at 542.
1. The first case to deal directly with this problem was Skemp v. Commissioner,
168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
2. Deductions of rental payments for property used in the taxpayer's trade or
business are generally allowed under section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of

1954. That section provides in part:

